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 Problems and Conclusions 
Europe As an Agent of Change: 
The Role of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the EU in Turkey’s Kurdish Policies 
At its core, Turkey’s Kurdish question is a deeply root-
ed ethno-political conflict originating from oppressive 
government policies against the cultural identity and 
fundamental rights of the Kurds. Although the armed 
insurgency led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
is the result – rather than the cause of – the conflict 
between the state and the Kurds, ever since its out-
break, the war between the PKK and the Turkish mili-
tary has overshadowed the roots of the conflict, en-
abling the state to frame it exclusively as counter-
terrorism. The overlap between the core demands of 
the Kurdish human rights movement and the political 
goals of the PKK notwithstanding, the war has only 
been one – though a critical – aspect of the conflict. 
The commencement of talks between the Turkish 
government and Abdullah Öcalan in late 2012, and 
the PKK’s subsequent announcement of an indefinite 
ceasefire, has raised hopes for a peaceful solution to 
the conflict. Recent regional developments – with the 
emergence of a de facto Kurdish self-rule in Syria and 
the increasing likelihood of a Kurdish state in Iraq – 
have made Turkey’s permanent settlement of its own 
conflict all the more pertinent. Certainly, the PKK’s 
declaration of the end of its armed insurgency is, in 
and of itself, a significant development and a potential 
milestone towards a durable political settlement. How-
ever, the achievement of a permanent ceasefire or even 
peace, as such, will not ipso facto suggest a durable so-
lution in the absence of structural reforms to ensure 
the Kurds’ equality – in law and in fact. At the moment, 
recognition of Kurdish demands are tied to the out-
come of the peace talks, notwithstanding that they 
concern individual rights that a democratic state 
should, at any rate, grant its citizens, as well as col-
lective rights, which should be negotiated with the 
elected representatives of the Kurds in parliament 
rather than the PKK’s leader in secret and informal 
peace talks. At any rate, the prospects for a peaceful 
settlement remain uncertain amidst a volatile politi-
cal situation in Turkey and in the Middle East. 
The ongoing peace talks in Turkey and the impli-
cations of the wars in Syria and Iraq on the Kurdish 
conflict have attracted a great deal of research and 
policy interest. Important as these developments are, 
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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
the exclusive framing of the issue within the discourse 
of “conflict resolution” bears the risk of reaching 
faulty policy analyses that attribute too much signi-
ficance to the cessation of fighting. The crux of the 
Kurdish issue remains the structural inequalities 
against the Kurds, which predate the conflict between 
the PKK and the Turkish military. These inequalities 
are deeply rooted in Turkey’s authoritarian political 
regime and can only be addressed through structural 
reforms aimed at establishing substantive democracy 
and the rule of law. 
Historically, democratisation in Turkey has been 
closely interlinked with the country’s European inte-
gration process. The desire to be a European Union 
(EU) member has led Turkey to subject itself to Euro-
pean oversight, notwithstanding its reluctance for a 
genuine democratic transition. Towards that end, 
Turkey recognised the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and granted its citi-
zens the right to take their grievances to the Stras-
bourg court. Once declared a candidate for EU member-
ship, Turkey committed to undertake the requisite 
reforms to fulfil the Union’s accession criteria, includ-
ing implementing the ECtHR’s rulings. These strategic 
foreign policy decisions enabled rights organisations 
in Turkey to exert pressure on the government through 
activating the European mechanisms. No domestic 
issue has preoccupied European institutions as inten-
sively as the Kurdish conflict, and no other civil society 
organisations have invoked European institutions as 
intensively as those in the Kurdish region. 
Current debates on the Kurdish demands in the 
framework of the peace talks often overlook the his-
tory in which these demands were shaped, communi-
cated and pursued, not only by the Kurdish national 
movement but also, and first and foremost, by the 
human rights activists in the Kurdish region. The legal 
and political mobilisation of Kurdish civil society vis-à-
vis European institutions raised awareness about the 
human rights abuses committed by the Turkish gov-
ernment and framed concrete rights claims for equali-
ty, justice and the rule of law. The ECtHR and the EU, 
for their part, have played a critical – though not 
necessarily always coherent and consistent – role in 
the relatively significant, albeit substantively limited, 
reforms adopted by Turkish governments since the 
late 1990s. At the same time, this European engage-
ment has not always pushed Turkey in the direction of 
enhancing the democratic participation and human 
rights of its Kurdish citizens, particularly in the post-
9/11 context. 
How have Turkey’s policies on the Kurdish issue 
evolved in the course of its engagement with Europe? 
How has Kurdish political and legal mobilisation vis-à-
vis European institutions evolved since the early 
1990s? What has been the actual impact of the ECtHR 
and the EU on Turkey’s Kurdish policies? This paper 
looks into the evolution of the trilateral relationship 
between Turkey, Europe and the Kurds over the course 
of the past three decades. Based on the current politi-
cal situation in Turkey and its region, it argues that 
there is a pressing need for European re-engagement 
in the Kurdish issue in a coherent, continuous and 
critical manner based on a systematic political dia-
logue with diversified domestic actors. 
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Turkey’s Policies towards the Kurds: The Historical Background 
The History, Law and Politics of Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
 
Turkey’s Policies towards the Kurds: 
The Historical Background 
Although the origins of the conflict date back to the 
late Ottoman times, the political and legal foundation 
of Turkey’s stance on the Kurdish question was laid 
down in the early Republican era.1 The policies devel-
oped by the Kemalist founders and furthered by suc-
cessive governments – military and civilian alike – 
can be grouped into the substantively and temporally 
overlapping categories of universal, territorial and 
selective. 
All Kurds, irrespective of their residence and loyalty 
to the state, have been universally subject to cultural 
assimilation. On the one hand, the state has denied 
the existence of Kurdish as being a distinct identity 
and, on the other, adopted measures to eliminate its 
visible traces. Beginning in the mid 1920s, the Kurdish 
names of geographical places were “turkified”; indi-
viduals were banned from giving Kurdish names to 
their children; speaking Kurdish was prohibited at 
public institutions and, at times, in public places; 
school books and official documents were cleared of 
the words “Kurd” and “Kurdish”; and the use of Kurd-
ish in broadcasting, education and political activities 
was banned.2 These policies continued with interrup-
tions and variations well into the 1990s. Notwith-
standing the recent reforms, some restrictions on the 
use of Kurdish in education and political activities 
remain. 
In addition, the Kurdish region has been governed 
by state-of-exception regimes, which, though discon-
tinued for brief periods, have been a constant form of 
governance in the eastern and south-eastern territo-
ries.3 The forced displacement of civilians has been an 
1  For a historical analysis, see Mesut Yeğen, The Kurdish Issue 
in the Discourse of the State (Turkish) (Istanbul, 2009); David 
McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London and New York, 
2004) (third edition); Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish 
Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925 (Austin, 
1989). 
2  Mesut Yeğen, “‘Prospective Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-Citizens’: 
Kurds in Turkey”, Middle East Journal 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 
597–615; McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds. Ibid. 
3  The first instance was the adoption of martial law through 
integral component of these exceptional legal regimes. 
Targeting community leaders and ordinary civilians 
alike, the policies of expulsion and relocation sought 
to achieve the dual goals of restoring central authority 
and weakening the Kurdish identity through dis-
rupting communal ties.4 
Third, there has been a selective restriction of 
Kurdish civil and political rights. Targeting members 
of the Kurdish national movement rather than ethnic 
Kurdish politicians as such, these restrictions were 
imposed both during military regimes and during 
times of “normalcy”. Since the late 1950s, when an 
urban Kurdish movement emerged within the broader 
socialist movement, the persecution of Kurdish politi-
cians has been a constant reality.5 The discriminatory 
restrictions on Kurdish political activities intensified 
with the establishment of the first pro-Kurdish party 
in 1990 and continued without interruption. 
The Emergence of the PKK and a 
New State Paradigm 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party was founded in 1978 
with the objective of waging an armed struggle to 
establish an independent Kurdistan. Although the 
1980 coup crushed all other political parties and or-
ganisations across the spectrum in Turkey, the PKK 
survived largely due to the decision of its founder, 
the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Turkish), no. 785, of 3 
March 1925 in the aftermath of the suppression of the Sheikh 
Said Rebellion. 
4  Although the first instance of the use of forced relocation 
as a means of suppressing Kurdish resistance was the 1926 
Settlement Law, displacement as a systematic policy targeting 
the masses started in 1934, when the revised law required the 
resettlement of those “who do not share the Turkish culture 
and are not of Turkish origin”, namely the Kurds. Settlement 
Law (Turkish), no. 885, 31 May 1926, Official Gazette, no. 409, 1 
July 1926; Settlement Law (Turkish), no. 2510, 14 June 1934, 
Official Gazette, no. 2733, 21 June 1934. 
5  For examples of high-profile criminal cases against Kurdish 
intellectuals and activists in the 1960s and 1970s, see Cengiz 
Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to 
Resistance (Oxon and New York, 2012); Nicole F. Watts, Activists 
in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey (Seattle, 2010). 
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The History, Law and Politics of Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
Abdullah Öcalan, to move the organisation across the 
border to Syria. The military regime’s severe atrocities 
against activists, opinion leaders and civilians in the 
Kurdish region led to a rapid increase in the number 
of new recruits to the PKK, turning it into a popular 
movement.6 
The worst of the Kurdish conflict occurred during 
the 1980s and 1990s. The 1982 constitution prohibited 
the use of Kurdish in the public expression of opinions 
and in broadcasting.7 A 1983 law banned Kurdish al-
together.8 Kurdish names were banned9 and topo-
graphic renaming resumed.10 Before handing power 
over to the civilians in 1983, the generals prepared the 
legal framework for tackling the Kurdish question 
within a security paradigm, including the establish-
ment of “state security courts” and the adoption of 
the State of Emergency Law.11 
The transition to civilian rule in late 1983 did not 
bring an improvement in these policies. The Turgut 
Özal government, arguably under pressure by the 
National Security Council, furthered the security para-
digm envisioned by the military junta. In May 1984, 
the state security courts began to operate in eight 
provinces, including two Kurdish provinces, and “did 
not differ substantially from military courts”, which 
operated during the martial law period.12 In June 1985, 
the “provincial village guard system”, a paramilitary 
force made up of Kurdish peasants armed and paid by 
the state, was set up. Operating under the command 
6  For more on the PKK, see Gunes, The Kurdish National Move-
ment in Turkey (see note 5); Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The 
PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York and Lon-
don, 2007); David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: 
Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (New York, 2006); Martin 
van Bruinessen, “Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: 
The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan”, MERIP Middle East Report 153 
(July–August 1988): 40–46. 
7  Former Articles 26 and 28, respectively. 
8  Law on Broadcasting in Languages Other than Turkish (Turkish), 
no. 2932, 19 October 1983, Official Gazette, no. 18199, 22 Octo-
ber 1983. 
9  Senem Aslan, “Incoherent State: The Controversy over 
Kurdish Naming in Turkey”, European Journal of Turkish Studies 
(Online), no. 10 (2009), para. 16, http://ejts.revues.org/4142. 
10  Kerem Öktem, “The Nation’s Imprint: Demographic 
Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican 
Turkey”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, no. 7 (2008), para. 
50, http://ejts.revues.org/2243. 
11  State of Emergency Law (Turkish), no. 2935, 25 October 
1983, Official Gazette, no. 18204, 27 October 1983.  
12  Amnesty International, Justice Delayed and Denied: The Persis-
tence of Protracted and Unfair Trials for Those Charged under Anti-
Terrorism Legislation (September 2006), 3. 
of the military, these guards have since been used 
extensively to not only fight with the PKK but also to 
conduct “counter-terrorism” operations against Kurd-
ish civilians. In 1987, when martial law across the 
country was formally brought to an end, a state of 
emergency was declared exclusively in the Kurdish 
region. An executive decree13 established the Regional 
Governorship of the State of Emergency, which was, 
over time, vested with extraordinary powers and ex-
empt from judicial review.14 Finally, in 1991, Parlia-
ment adopted the Anti-Terror Law primarily for the 
purpose of combating the PKK. Turkish judicial author-
ities have interpreted the law broadly to curtail peace-
ful Kurdish opposition, censor the Kurdish press, 
suspend political freedoms and ban one pro-Kurdish 
political party after another since 1993.15 
Limited legal reforms and political attempts to end 
the armed conflict went hand in hand with these mili-
tarist measures. In 1991, the categorical ban on the 
Kurdish language was eased through the legalisation 
of its use for “non-political” purposes, which resulted 
in the flourishing of books, newspapers and music 
albums in Kurdish. However, the restrictions on the 
use of Kurdish in political activities were retained, 
leading to the continued prosecution of politicians 
simply for speaking Kurdish in their campaigns. The 
state of emergency had enabled the state to resort to 
wartime measures. From the late 1980s into the late 
1990s, around one million civilians,16 predominantly 
Kurdish, were forcefully evicted by security forces 
from more than 3,000 villages and hamlets.17 Nearly 
13  Decree with the Force of Law Establishing the Regional 
Governorship of the State of Emergency, no. 285, 10 July 
1987, Official Gazette, no. 19517, 14 July 1987. 
14  Among these powers were the evacuation of villages, the 
temporary or permanent banning of the print media, the 
expulsion from the region of individuals deemed to threaten 
public order, the banning of union activities and the restric-
tion of freedoms of assembly and to demonstrate. Decrees no. 
424, 425 and 430. 
15  As documented by various ECtHR judgments: see Dilek 
Kurban, Ozan Erözden and Haldun Gülalp, Supranational 
Rights Litigation, Implementation and the Domestic Impact of Stras-
bourg Court Jurisprudence: A Case Study of Turkey, unpublished 
report for the JURISTRAS project funded by the European 
Commission (October 2008), http://www.juristras.eliamep.gr. 
See also Watts, Activists in Office (see note 5). 
16  A government-commissioned survey estimated the num-
ber of displaced during the 1986–2005 period to be 950,000–
1,200,000. Hacettepe University Institution of Population 
Studies, Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Sur-
vey (Turkish), (Ankara, June 2006). 
17  Turkish Grand National Assembly, Report by the Parliament 
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The Evolution of Democratic Kurdish Resistance 
half of the displaced received “eviction orders” by 
security forces, in most cases due to their “unwilling-
ness to become village guards”.18 Joining the village 
guard force was not necessarily a shield against dis-
placement; those found to be reluctant to fight against 
the PKK were subsequently displaced by the military.19 
The carte blanche given to the military authorities 
opened a new era in the Kurdish conflict, leading to 
the intensification of atrocities. The Gendarmerie 
Intelligence in Combating Terrorism (JİTEM), a clan-
destine criminal unit established within the military, 
was engaged in systematic atrocities against human 
rights activists, journalists and elected officials.20 
Extrajudicial executions,21 torture and enforced dis-
appearances were common phenomena in Kurdish 
urban centres, particularly during the first half of the 
1990s. In addition to the censorship of the media,22 
dozens of members of the Kurdish press were tortured 
or (even) summarily executed.23 In rural areas, the 
forced eviction of Kurdish civilians was accompanied 
with property destruction, the burning of forests, 
extrajudicial executions and torture. 
Research Commission Formed with the Objective of Identifying the 
Remedies to be Undertaken on the Basis of Research into the Problems 
of Citizens who have Migrated as a Result of Evacuation of Settlements 
in East and Southeast Anatolia (Turkish), (Ankara, 14 January 
1998), 11–13. 
18  Hacettepe University, Turkey Migration and Internally Dis-
placed Population Survey (see note 16), 98 and 129.  
19  Dilek Kurban and Mesut Yeğen, On the Verge of Justice: The 
State and the Kurds in the Aftermath of Forced Migration/An Assess-
ment of the Compensation Law no. 5233 – The Case of Van (Turkish), 
(Istanbul, February 2012), 91. 
20  Parliamentary commissions established in the 1990s to 
investigate the state’s involvement in political assassinations, 
unresolved murders and other criminal activities established 
that the activities of JİTEM “were an un-debatable reality”, 
though its exact function remained unknown. Human Rights 
Watch, Time for Justice: Ending Impunity for Killings and Disappear-
ances in 1990s Turkey (USA, September 2012), 10, citing the 
report of the Parliamentary Commission on Susurluk. 
21  Between 1990 and 2007, more than one hundred pro-
Kurdish party members and activists, including a DEP deputy, 
were murdered by unidentified perpetrators. Watts, Activists 
in Office (see note 5), 100–101. 
22  For a first-hand account of the censorship in the main-
stream Turkish media by journalists who covered the atroci-
ties of the military in the Kurdish region, see the documen-
tary by Sami Solmaz, Witnesses of the War (Turkey, 2012). 
23  A total of 27 reporters, editors and distributors of the 
daily Özgür Gündem were killed in the Kurdish region during 
its short publication life between May 1992 and April 1994. 
Şenay Aydemir, “Its 27 Employees Have Been Murdered” 
(Turkish), Radikal, 18 March 2011. 
The state was not the sole agent of violence. The 
PKK summarily executed its dissident militants and 
targeted state agents for killing as well as Kurdish 
political elite accused of being co-opted by the state, 
members of leftist and rival Kurdish organisations, 
village guards and their families, and Kurdish civilians 
who refused to take sides in the war.24 Although the 
vast majority of village evictions were carried out by 
Turkish security forces, the PKK also displaced Kurdish 
civilians for their actual or perceived collaboration 
with the state.25 
The Evolution of 
Democratic Kurdish Resistance 
The Kurds challenged state repression through legal 
mobilisation and electoral participation. The former 
was carried out by lawyers, mostly living in the Kurd-
ish region, by bringing the grievances of Kurdish civil-
ians before the ECtHR. Until the early 1990s, the indi-
vidual petition mechanism, which the Turkish govern-
ment had recognised in 1987, had been unknown to 
the Kurdish victims and lawyers. The Turkish courts, 
for their part, had systematically refused to review 
the acts of state officials, particularly in the Kurdish 
region. The 1992 visit to Diyarbakır by a group of 
British human rights lawyers from Essex University 
marked a turning point for the Kurds’ quest for jus-
tice.26 A long-term cooperation commenced between 
British and Kurdish lawyers, who jointly filed dozens 
24  Marcus, Blood and Belief (see note 6); Martin van Bruinessen, 
“The Nature and Uses of Violence in the Kurdish Conflict”, 
paper presented at the international colloquium Ethnic Con-
struction and Political Violence, organised by the Fondazione 
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Cortona, 2–3 July 1999. 
25  Turkish Grand National Assembly, Report by the Parliament 
Research Commission (see note 17). 
26  The visit was organised by Kerim Yıldız, a UK-based Kurd-
ish refugee and founder of the Kurdish Human Rights Project 
in London. For the activism of Kurdish diaspora organisations 
in Europe more broadly, see Bilgin Ayata, “The Politics of 
Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of the Forced Migra-
tion of Kurds in Turkey and Europe”, unpublished thesis 
submitted to the Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, Janu-
ary 2011); Marlies Casier, “Contesting the ‘Truth’ of Turkey’s 
Human Rights Situation: State-Association Interactions in 
and outside the Southeast”, European Journal of Turkish Studies 
(online), no. 10 (2009); Başak Çalı, “Human Rights Discourse 
and Domestic Human Rights NGOs”, in Human Rights in Turkey, 
ed. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat Philadelphia (Pennsylvania, 2007), 
217–232. 
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The History, Law and Politics of Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
of cases.27 The Kurdish lawyers, out of necessity and 
urgency, became the pioneers of ECtHR litigation in 
Turkey. The Court issued hundreds of judgments, 
documenting the grave human rights abuses commit-
ted by state security forces against Kurdish civilians. 
As in earlier decades, the Kurdish activists also 
contested the state through electoral politics, though 
this time with their own party. What started in 1987 
with a handful of Kurdish politicians entering parlia-
ment with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) 
gave rise to the first pro-Kurdish party, the People’s 
Labour Party (HEP), in 1990.28 Although HEP and its 
successor parties were not established by the PKK, they 
share with it the same sociological basis and similar 
ideological/political leaning. To circumvent the 10 per 
cent threshold, the pro-Kurdish parties entered parlia-
ment through pre-election coalitions (1991) or inde-
pendent candidates (since 2007). Despite the concerted 
efforts of the Turkish judiciary, these parties survived 
through a cat and mouse game.29 Yet, their members 
could not escape prosecution for using Kurdish in 
their political activities and advocating Kurdish lan-
guage and cultural rights.30 They have also been sub-
ject to PKK influence or coercion, with varying fre-
quency and degree, depending on the prevalent politi-
cal climate in Turkey and the region.31 
The year 1999 marked the beginning of Öcalan’s 
life imprisonment and the PKK’s ceasefire,32 on the 
27  Interview with Françoise Hampson, Boyle’s colleague and 
long-term collaborator in the Kurdish cases filed in Stras-
bourg. Quoted in Kurban, Erözden and Gülalp, Supranational 
Rights Litigation (see note 15), 4. 
28  HEP was established on 7 June 1990 by a group of Turkish 
and Kurdish SHP deputies who resigned from the party in 
protest over its decision to expel seven Kurdish parliamentar-
ians for having participated in a Kurdish conference organ-
ised in Paris in 1989. 
29  Between 1993 and 2009, the Constitutional Court closed 
five pro-Kurdish parties. The dissolution cases were based on 
the constitutional principle of territorial unity and the pros-
ecutorial argument that they were organically linked to the 
PKK. 
30  The legal framework governing political participation in 
Turkey still preserves its restrictive character. Under the Law 
on Political Parties (no. 2820), political parties are banned 
from “claiming the existence of minorities” and advocating 
minority linguistic and cultural rights (Article 81). 
31  For more on the dynamics of the relationship between the 
PKK and the pro-Kurdish political parties, see Watts, Activists 
in Office (see note 5). 
32  Although this was not the PKK’s first ceasefire, it resulted 
in the longest. Following “a period of retreat and reorganiza-
tion” between 1999 and 2003, in which it “levelled down its 
demands, ceased military activities”, and “withdrew the 
one hand, and Turkey’s EU process on the other. The 
cessation of violence in the Kurdish region and EU-
induced reforms gave momentum to democratisation 
efforts, which lasted until around 2005, when the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government 
halted the reforms and the PKK resumed violence. 
During this time, the Kurdish demands for rights were 
principally of an individual nature and were articu-
lated by human rights organisations. Pro-Kurdish 
political parties were absent in parliament and their 
representation in local government was in its early 
stages.33 By the second half of the 2000s, the Democ-
ratic Society Party (DTP) mayors, more experienced in 
their second term, became the main representatives of 
the Kurdish people and started to demand collective 
rights of a political nature. This was both the 
consequence and cause of heightened oppression by 
security forces, facilitated by revised criminal laws. 
In 2007, the Kurdish national movement34 returned 
to the Turkish parliament after 13 years of absence. 
The DTP participated in the elections through 
independent candidates, to whom the threshold does 
not apply. Slightly more than half (21 out of 43) of the 
nominated candidates were elected and formed a DTP 
majority of its guerrilla forces from Turkey onto Northern 
Iraq”, the PKK resumed fighting in 2004. Ahmet Hamdi 
Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, “The PKK in the 2000s: Continu-
ity through Breaks?”, in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Politi-
cal Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, ed. Marlies Casier and 
Joost Jongerden (USA and Canada, 2011), 143–161, here 153. 
33  These parties progressively increase the number of mu-
nicipalities under their control. In 1999, HADEP won 37 
municipalities (7 of which were provincial); in 2004, while 
experiencing a fall in its overall votes and losing four prov-
inces to the AKP, Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) won 64 
municipalities (including 5 provincial); in 2009, the DTP 
won 98 municipalities (including 8 provincial and 50 dis-
trict); and finally in March 2014, the Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP) won around 100 municipalities.  
34  In using this term, I refer to the broader political move-
ment comprised of both illegal armed groups such as the PKK 
and civil society organisations pursuing non-violent resis-
tance, including, but not limited to, the political tradition 
currently represented by the Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP). What make this wide range of actors part of the same 
movement are their common rights claims, such as educa-
tion in Kurdish in public schools, autonomy in the Kurdish 
region, the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity and 
the removal of structural barriers to the Kurds’ participation 
in the democratic system. In no way do I ignore the histori-
cal, ideological and political differences between various 
actors, first and foremost their positions with regard to the 
use of violence in the pursuit of these goals and their rela-
tions with the PKK. 
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group after they entered parliament.35 This has 
intensified the vicious circle of a strengthened 
Kurdish national movement making bolder demands; 
intensified judicial and bureaucratic harassment of 
Kurdish mayors and politicians; heightened police 
brutality during demonstrations in the region; 
increased PKK violence; and government policies 
oscillating between a reform rhetoric occasionally 
supported by concrete steps and the conventional 
security approach. 
35  The BDP pursued the same strategy in 2011, increasing 
the number of seats to 35. 
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Europe’s Initial Engagement of and Impact on the 
Kurdish Question 
 
Since the establishment of the republic, Turkey has 
seen its integration with the European legal and politi-
cal order as a strategic move to further its economic, 
military and political relations with the “developed 
Western civilisation”. The state has perceived human 
rights as a “bitter pill” to swallow in the name of eco-
nomic development and modernisation through Euro-
pean integration. Successive Turkish governments 
undertook the minimal reforms necessary to remain 
connected to Europe without having to transition to 
a truly democratic order. 
The legal and political mobilisation of the Kurds 
succeeded in drawing European institutions into the 
conflict. Although the continuity of unjust policies 
against the Kurds provided the moral justification for 
European engagement, the Turkish government’s 
foreign policy choices made this involvement possible. 
By the time Turkey was declared a candidate for EU 
membership, a substantial ECtHR case law had already 
developed concerning its unlawful practices in the 
state of emergency region, owing to the Kurdish law-
yers’ extensive use of the individual petition mecha-
nism. Turkey’s self-submission to the Convention 
system and pursuit of European Community member-
ship led to its “entrapment ... in a Catch-22 situa-
tion”36 and had a “boomerang effect”37 on its policies 
on the Kurdish question. 
Historical Background: Why and How Turkey 
Has Engaged with Europe 
Turkey’s engagement with the European legal and 
political order is more than half a century old. It 
started with the entry into the Council of Europe (CoE) 
in August 1949 and the ratification of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR/the Convention) in 
1954. This early engagement was driven not by a 
36  Ümit Cizre, “The Truth and Fiction about (Turkey’s) Human 
Rights Politics”, Human Rights Review 3, no. 1, (October–Decem-
ber 2001): 55–77, here 61. 
37  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn A. Sikkink, Activists beyond 
Borders (Ithaca, 1998). 
normative commitment but by realpolitik.38 Having 
aligned with the US-led bloc after the Second World 
War, Turkey saw that it was in its security interest to 
join the institutions set up by Western European coun-
tries.39 Foreign policy considerations – in particular 
the endeavour to uphold a power balance with Greece 
– also played a role. To complement this political alli-
ance with an economic one, Turkey applied for mem-
bership to the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1959. 
The stability, security and prestige associated with 
being part of the emerging order in Europe offset for 
Turkey, at least initially, the risks involved in subju-
gating domestic policies to international oversight. At 
the same time, the risk was there. Therefore, Turkey 
for a long time kept its engagement with the CoE at a 
minimum. For example, notwithstanding its ratifica-
tion of the Convention, it did not accept the jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR until 1990.40 The weakness of the 
European Convention system41 enabled Turkey to 
more or less control the terms of its relationship with 
the CoE. 
After its transition to multi-party democracy, Tur-
key experienced three coup d’etats followed by periods 
of military rule, multiple declarations of state of emer-
gency and martial law, and the suspension of human 
rights. The political climate of the Cold War, where 
national sovereignty was the supreme norm governing 
world affairs, by and large insulated Turkey against 
international pressure and gave it considerable leeway 
in its domestic policies. Certainly, the military inter-
ventions received condemnation and criticism from 
European institutions, but much of it remained sym-
bolic and ineffective. In this regard, the EEC, which 
38  Füsun Türkmen, “Turkey’s Participation in Global and 
Regional Human Rights Regimes”, in Human Rights in Turkey, 
ed. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (Pennsylvania, 2007), 249–261, 
here 252. 
39  At the international level, Turkey became a founding 
member of the UN in 1949 and joined NATO in 1952. 
40  Similarly, not until the 2000s did Turkey sign the UN’s 
twin human rights covenants adopted in 1966. 
41  Until the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR in 
1998, the individual petition mechanism and the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction were not mandatory for CoE member states. 
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had not yet accepted Turkey as a candidate country, 
was better situated to exert pressure. The Community 
reacted to the 1960 military coup by freezing relations 
with Turkey. Although relations resumed with the 
Association Agreement,42 the 1971 coup and Turkey’s 
military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 led the Com-
munity to continue deferring the Customs Union en-
visioned in the Agreement. 
The 1980 intervention, by far the bloodiest and 
most repressive coup, inflicted the greatest damage to 
Turkey’s relations with Europe. In protest of the grave 
human rights abuses in Turkey, both the European 
Community and the CoE exerted political – and, in the 
case of the European Community, economic – pressure 
on the military to return to democracy. There were 
heated debates within both organisations over the 
most effective strategy against the junta. The Euro-
pean Parliament adopted resolutions harshly criti-
cising the conduct of the military authorities43 and 
used its – limited but slowly growing – powers for 
restraining the EU’s engagement with the Turkish 
government. The CoE carried out human rights fact-
finding missions in Turkey while attempts were 
made in its Parliamentary Assembly to suspend the 
country’s membership altogether.44 Eventually, partly 
as a result of this European pressure,45 the military 
regime handed power back to the civilians, but not 
before drafting an authoritarian constitution to shield 
itself with amnesty against possible future prosecu-
tion. 
In 1983, as the first civilian elected to government 
after the transition to democracy, Turgut Özal came to 
power with a commitment to elevate – as a strategic 
policy – Turkey’s engagement with Europe. The next 
year, the PKK launched its first military attack. From 
then on, Turkey’s counter-terrorism and European 
integration projects went hand in hand. The most 
dramatic turn in relations with European institutions 
came in 1987. In January, Turkey recognised the right 
of individual petition to the ECtHR, and in April it ap-
42  Agreement Establishing an Association between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Turkey, Ankara, 12 Septem-
ber 1963, Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L 361/1, 
31 December 77.  
43  See e.g., European Parliament, Resolution on the Events in 
Turkey, 18 September 1980; Resolution on Death Sentence Imposed 
on 52 Turkish Trade Union Leaders, 22 June 1982; Resolution on 
Political Situation in Turkey, 8 July 1982. 
44  İhsan Dağı, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980–1983: 
The Impact of European Diplomacy”, Middle Eastern Studies 32, 
no. 2 (April 1996): 124–141, here 131–132. 
45  Ibid., here 136. 
plied for European Community membership. Allowing 
Turkish citizens to take their cases to Strasbourg was 
seen by Özal as a strategic decision to enhance Turkey’s 
prospects for European Community membership.46 
On the other hand, on 10 July 1987, the government 
declared a state of emergency in the Kurdish region. 
These three decisions created a paradoxical situa-
tion in which the government gave carte blanche to 
its security forces in their counter-terrorism efforts 
only a few months after subjecting its policies to Euro-
pean oversight. The incompatibility of Özal’s domestic 
and foreign policies became evident when the Euro-
pean Community, based on the negative opinion of 
the Commission,47 rejected Turkey’s membership 
application on the basis, among other things, of its 
human rights record. Notwithstanding – and partly 
because of – this rejection, Turkey recognised the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction in 1990 to further demonstrate 
its commitment to human rights. 
The Early Engagement of European 
Institutions in Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
Historical developments in Europe and Turkey in the 
1990s set them apart and led them in different direc-
tions. In Europe, the end of the Cold War and the 
genocide in Former Yugoslavia led to the resurgence 
of a normative commitment to minority protection. In 
1990, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) adopted the Copenhagen Principles,48 
requiring states to ensure full equality between the 
minorities and the majority.49 These Principles gained 
46  The European Parliament had made this link clear in 
1985, setting Turkey’s recognition of the right to individual 
petition as a condition for the normalisation of relations. 
“European Parliament, Resolution on the Human Rights 
Situation in Turkey, 23 October 1985”, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, no. C 343/61, 31 December 1985. 
47  Commission of the European Communities, Commission 
Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, SEC(89) 
2290 final/2, 20 December 1989. 
48  The organisation was subsequently called the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). For a 
critical assessment of the Copenhagen Principles and the 
CSCE/OSCE’s reluctance to be actively involved in Turkey’s 
Kurdish conflict, see Gülistan Gürbey, “The Kurdish Conflict 
in Turkey- (not) a Subject for the OSCE?”, Helsinki Monitor 12, 
no. 1 (2001): 7–20. 
49  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Docu-
ment of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 1990, http://www.osce.org/odihr/ 
elections/14304?download=true. 
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legal significance when the Council of the EU, estab-
lished under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, adopted 
them in 1993 as accession criteria for candidate coun-
tries. The CoE followed course by adopting the Euro-
pean Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, which the EU required its candi-
dates to ratify. At an institutional level, the EU and 
the CoE were fast evolving from intergovernmental 
bodies of economic and political cooperation into 
transnational legal regimes with strong human rights 
mechanisms. The courts of these organisations – the 
European Court of Justice and the ECtHR – had taken 
the lead in developing strong and expanding human 
rights regimes, which were not envisioned by the 
founding fathers, and certainly not welcomed by all 
member states. In sum, the European political and 
legal order of the 1990s presented a completely differ-
ent picture than that of the 1950s, when Turkey initi-
ated its engagement with the CoE and the EU. 
The Turkey of the 1990s was in a very different tra-
jectory. The intensification of the war between the 
PKK and the Turkish armed forces at the turn of the 
decade strengthened the role and influence of the 
military in politics. In 1993, following the death of 
President Özal while he was reportedly in the process 
of seeking peace with the PKK, the hardliner Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller declared that the resolution of 
the Kurdish issue was now in the hands of the mili-
tary. As part of its anti-terrorism campaign, the state 
resorted to extra-legal measures. Clandestine units 
within the security forces were engaged in enforced 
disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings 
against Kurdish politicians, journalists, activists and 
civilians suspected of PKK membership. As in the 
1980s, European institutions reacted strongly, naming 
and shaming Turkey for its human rights violations. 
The EU 
From the outset, the EU sought to craft a balance 
between its economic and geostrategic interests vis-à-
vis Turkey and its normative commitment to human 
rights as part of its enlargement policy.50 In this re-
spect, there have been differences between the EU 
50  For an argument that the European Council’s key decisions 
on Turkey were adopted in accordance with the security 
interests of the Union and its member states, see Ebru Turhan, 
The European Council Decisions Related to Turkey’s Accession to the 
EU: Interests v. Norms (Baden-Baden, 2012). 
organs. Initially, the European Parliament advocated a 
political approach, pressing for the termination of 
relations at moments of rupture with democracy and 
human rights in Turkey. The European Council, on 
the other hand, refrained from making the strength-
ening of its economic ties with Turkey conditional on 
human rights. Over time, the divergence of positions 
became less apparent due to the evolution of the EU 
into a political union, the strengthening of the role of 
Parliament and the positive political developments in 
Turkey. 
Long before the EU accepted the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria as a sine qua non for accession, Turkey’s 
human rights record was in the radar of Parliament.51 
However, Parliament did not specifically address the 
Kurdish issue until the 1988 mass killings by the 
Saddam Hussein regime,52 which drew Europe’s atten-
tion to the plight of Kurds everywhere.53 Although 
Parliament adopted several resolutions condemning 
the human rights abuses against the Kurds,54 its most 
radical attempt to restrain the EU’s relations with 
Turkey came in 1994, when parliamentary immunity 
of 14 deputies from the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party 
(DEP) was lifted, leading to the arrest and conviction 
of eight.55 The European Parliament suspended the 
51  In the 1980s, Parliament adopted numerous resolutions 
condemning the human rights violations committed by the 
military regime between 1980 and 1983 and the civilian 
government thereafter. 
52  In two separate military campaigns (Al Anfal and Halab-
dja) carried out in 1988, the Iraqi government systematically 
killed tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians through, inter 
alia, the use of chemical weapons. 
53  With the exception of a 1987 resolution over the Arme-
nian genocide, which acknowledged the problem in Turkey’s 
south-east, none of the resolutions adopted during the 1984 
to 1989 term made a specific reference to the Kurdish issue. 
Marlies Casier, “The Politics of Solidarity: The Kurdish Ques-
tion in the European Parliament”, in Nationalisms and Politics in 
Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, ed. Marlies 
Casier and Joost Jongerden (Routledge, 2011), 197–217, here 
199–200. 
54  Of the 16 resolutions on the Kurds adopted by Parliament 
from 1989 to 1994, five were specifically about the Kurds in 
Turkey. Ibid. 
55  On 2–3 March 1994, Parliament stripped seven deputies 
of their immunity to enable their prosecution on terrorism 
charges. The immunity of the remaining seven was removed 
by the Constitutional Court when it dissolved the DEP in 
June. Whereas six of the deputies fled to Europe and have 
since been living in exile, the remaining eight were sen-
tenced to prison terms ranging from 3.5 years to 15 years. 
Five of these served a 10-year prison term. 
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EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee56 and asked 
the Council to suspend the Customs Union negotia-
tions with Turkey. When that failed, Parliament used 
its enhanced powers under the Maastricht Treaty of 
1993 and refused to give assent to the Customs Union 
unless Turkey improved the human rights situation 
and the treatment of the Kurds. In 1995, Parliament 
awarded the imprisoned Kurdish deputy, Leyla Zana, 
with the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought,57 
marking the beginning of its active involvement with 
the Kurdish issue.58 
To overcome the opposition of the European Par-
liament, Turkey adopted constitutional improvements 
and amended the Anti-Terror Law, making possible 
the release of 79 political prisoners. Two of the impris-
oned Kurdish deputies were released, and Turkey gave 
assurances that the cases of those remaining would 
be heard by the ECHR.59 Although these were largely 
changes on paper and there were strong doubts about 
Turkey’s commitment to democracy and human 
rights, Parliament eventually gave in to the “intensive 
lobbying by the Council and the Commission”60 and 
approved the Customs Union on 13 December 1995.61 
Although the decision to implement the Customs 
Union brought about a degree of discursive change 
and “tactical concessions”62 on the part of Turkish 
official circles, widespread abuses and the impunity of 
perpetrators prevailed, in the Kurdish region and 
beyond. The EU’s rejection of Turkey’s candidacy in 
1997 was both the consequence and the cause of this 
phenomenon. When Turkey unilaterally suspended 
the political dialogue as a protest of what it perceived 
to be discriminatory treatment, the Commission was 
tasked with continuing relations at a technical level. 
In 1998, the Commission prepared a European strat-
56  Established in the 1960s, the Joint Committee resumed 
in 1996. Christopher Piening, “The European Parliament: 
Influencing the EU’s External Relations”, paper presented at 
the 5th biennial ECSA Conference, Seattle, 30 May 1997. 
57  When she was awarded the prize, Zana was serving a 15-
year jail sentence. She personally collected the prize on 14 
October 2004, after her release from prison. 
58  Personal communication with Member of the European 
Parliament Hélène Flautre in Brussels on 28 June 2013. 
59  Piening, “The European Parliament” (see note 56), 4. 
60  Flavia Zanon, “The European Parliament: An Autonomous 
Foreign Policy Identity?”, in The Role of Parliaments in European 
Foreign Policy: Debating on Accountability and Legitimacy, ed. 
Esthér Barbe and Anna Herranz (Barcelona, 2005), 5. 
61  Decision no. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 
22 December 1995 on Implementing the Final Phase of the 
Customs Union (96/142/EC). 
62  Cizre, “The Truth and Fiction” (see note 36), 68–69. 
egy to help Turkey prepare for membership, initiated 
technical negotiations with Ankara and released its 
first progress report on Turkey.63 Based on the positive 
assessments in the Commission’s next report, the 
European Council declared Turkey as a candidate for 
accession in 1999. 
This decision commenced the EU’s monitoring of 
Turkey’s compliance with the accession criteria, in-
cluding the protection of minority rights. Turkey’s 
treatment of its Kurdish citizens has become a litmus 
test for its prospects for membership. The EU called on 
Turkey to recognise the cultural rights of the Kurds, 
ensure the socio-economic development of the Kurd-
ish region and enable the return of the displaced. 
Kurdish broadcasting and teaching, the abolishment 
of the village guard system, the clearance of land-
mines and compensation for displacement were put 
forth under the rubric of these general themes. 
The Kurdish demands for truth and justice, on the 
other hand, were either overlooked or downscaled in 
the Commission reports. The impunity of the security 
forces has not been systematically handled either. Al-
though the Commission pointed out the abuses com-
mitted by the Turkish military – including the “large-
scale forced evacuation and destruction of villages” – 
in its very first report,64 it did not mention the issue 
until 2001, when it briefly referred to the disappear-
ance of two People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) officials 
following their “visit” to a police station.65 In reality, 
these were elected politicians called in by the local 
security officers and seen last entering the police sta-
tion. This was a clear case of enforced disappearance, 
which moreover took place in 2001, when Turkey was 
subject to pre-accession monitoring. The Commission 
did not refer to this case in subsequent reports, nor 
did it publicly pressure Turkey to address the thou-
sands of enforced disappearances and political killings 
by unidentified perpetrators. 
The ECtHR 
The Strasbourg court’s first judgment on the Kurdish 
conflict was on a forced displacement case, where the 
Court made an exception to its admissibility criterion, 
which requires the prior exhaustion of domestic 
63  For a brief history of the development of EU-Turkey rela-
tions, see the Commission’s progress reports. 
64  European Commission, Turkey 1998 progress report, 19. 
65  European Commission, Turkey 2001 progress report, 29. 
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remedies.66 Considering the applicants’ “insecurity 
and vulnerability” following their forced eviction and 
the absence of any official inquiry into the incidents, 
the Court assessed the prospects of a national court 
decision against the security forces to be “negligible” 
and concluded that remedies were de facto unavailable 
in south-eastern Turkey. It granted a similar exemp-
tion to dozens of applicants in subsequent cases. With-
in a few years, the ECtHR effectively became an appeals 
court for human rights victims in Turkey. 
In its judgments, the ECtHR established, among 
other things, that unacknowledged detention is a 
“complete negation” of the right to liberty67; the close 
relatives of the disappeared may themselves be victims 
of inhuman treatment; the enforced disappearance 
of a person is a violation of the right to life68; the pres-
ence of a military judge in state security courts vio-
lates the right to a fair trial; and counter-terrorism 
does not justify the incommunicado detention for up 
to 30 days.69 The Court stressed, time and again, that 
the notion of “effective remedy” in the meaning of 
Article 13 “entails, in addition to the payment of com-
pensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of those responsible.”70 On the other 
hand, the ECtHR refrained from concluding that these 
atrocities were an administrative practice in the Kurd-
ish region and dismissed the applicants’ persistent 
claims of ethnic discrimination. 
In its defences before Strasbourg, Turkey categori-
cally denied the allegations, disputed the facts claimed 
by the applicants and refused to submit the informa-
tion requested by the Court.71 It was so uncooperative 
that the Court was eventually obliged to hold fact-
finding hearings in Turkey so as to establish the facts.72 
66  ECtHR, Akdıvar and Others v. Turkey (Grand Chamber), Appli-
cation no. 21893/93, 16 September 1996. 
67  ECtHR, Çiçek v. Turkey, Application no. 25704/94, 27 Febru-
ary 2001. 
68  ECtHR, Ipek v. Turkey, Application no. 25760/94, 17 Febru-
ary 2004. 
69  ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, Application no. 21987/93, 18 De-
cember 1996. 
70  ECtHR, Aksoy, para. 98; ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 24 
April 1998, para. 96.  
71  Başak Çalı, “The Logics of Supranational Human Rights 
Litigation, Official Acknowledgment, and Human Rights Re-
form: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court 
of Human Rights, 1996–2006”, Law and Social Inquiry 35, no. 2 
(2010): 311–337. 
72  See e.g. ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker; the ECtHR, Ertak v. Turkey, 
Application no. 20764/92, May 2000. 
The government not only denied political responsibil-
ity, but also put the blame in many cases on the PKK, 
which it argued was responsible for the disappearance 
of civilians, had destroyed property and forcefully 
evicted villagers in retaliation for their cooperation 
with the Turkish military and refusal to join the PKK. 
Although Turkey has, over time, come to “regret the 
occurrence of individual cases of destruction of home, 
property and possessions resulting from the acts of 
agents of the State,”73 it has always denied the exist-
ence of systematic and grave human rights violations 
as a state policy in the Kurdish region. 
The Domestic Impact of Early European 
Engagement in the Kurdish Question 
Turkey’s declaration as an EU candidate was a turning 
point in its relations with European institutions. Since 
the EU began to treat the ECtHR judgments as bench-
marks to measure Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the 
accession criteria, the timely and proper execution of 
these judgments has become tied to Turkey’s pros-
pects for EU membership, rendering non-cooperation 
with the Strasbourg court to be too costly. With the 
stated goal of executing the judgments of the ECtHR 
and fulfilling the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, 
successive Turkish governments adopted a series of 
reforms. 
The reforms of 2001–2002 removed the constitu-
tional bans on the use of minority languages in broad-
casting and the dissemination of thought; abolished 
the death penalty in peacetime; legalised broadcasting 
in select minority languages; allowed the opening of 
private courses for the teaching of minority languages; 
and abolished the state of emergency in all but two 
provinces, with a commitment to completely end it at 
the end of 2002. In relative terms, the reforms were so 
remarkable that the Commission concluded that they 
“provide much of the ground work for strengthening 
democracy and the protection of human rights in 
Turkey.”74 
In November 2002, the AKP came to power on a pro-
EU platform. In recognition of the new government’s 
political will to continue the reforms, the EU declared 
that if “the European Council in December 2004, on 
the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
73  ECtHR, Kınay and Kınay v. Turkey (friendly settlement), 
Application no. 31890/96, para. 22(2). 
74  European Commission, Turkey 2002 Progress Report, 46. 
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Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenha-
gen political criteria”, it would open accession nego-
tiations “without delay”.75 During the next two years, 
the AKP government introduced new reforms. Some of 
these concerned the Kurdish question: Zana and the 
other Kurdish parliamentarians were released, the 
scope of the right to broadcasting in Kurdish was ex-
panded, the state of emergency regime was abolished 
in the remaining provinces and a law to compensate 
the monetary losses of the displaced was adopted.76 
Others were of a general nature: the Penal Code was 
revised and the supremacy of international human 
rights law was introduced as a constitutional norm. 
Many of the post-1999 reforms were quite limited in 
substance. Only a handful of minority languages uni-
laterally decided by the government were allowed to 
be used in private broadcasting and taught in private 
courses. The state did not assume any positive obliga-
tions to finance these reforms, keeping intact the un-
equal treatment of Turkish – fully financed by public 
resources in all walks of life – and the remaining lan-
guages. The stringent bureaucratic conditions attached 
to these rights rendered their exercise very difficult.77 
And yet, some of these changes, such as the abolition 
of the death penalty, were so remarkable that the re-
forms were overall considered as “a breakthrough, a 
revolution in the overall mentality in Turkey”.78 
Caught between the necessity to acknowledge this 
relative progress and the resistance in some member 
states to Turkey’s accession,79 the EU produced a 
middle solution, inventing “a brand new language in 
the report methodology”.80 It concluded in December 
2004 that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen 
75  Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 
Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, 
no. 15917/02, 29 January 2003. 
76  Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism 
and the Fight against Terrorism (Turkish), no. 5233, 17 July 
2004, Official Gazette, no. 25535, 27 July 2004. 
77  For an analysis of the substance and implementation of 
these reforms, see Dilek Kurban, “Confronting Equality: The 
Need for Constitutional Protection of Minorities on Turkey’s 
Path to the European Union”, Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 35, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 151–214. 
78  Personal communication with EU official-1 on 11 Novem-
ber 2013. 
79  The resistance was particularly strong in France at the 
time, causing President Jacques Chirac to approve the open-
ing of accession negotiations with Turkey on the condition of 
them being open-ended. Turhan, The European Council Decisions 
(see note 50), 328. 
80  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
political criteria” and decided to commence the acces-
sion negotiations the following year.81 
 
81  Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 
Copenhagen European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004, 
no. 16238/04 REV 1, 1 February 2005. 
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A series of global, regional and domestic developments 
changed the degree and nature of Europe’s engagement 
in Turkey’s Kurdish policies. In the 1990s, when the 
EU and the ECtHR issued critical resolutions, reports 
and judgments against Turkey, the Kurdish region was 
governed by a state of exception, the security forces 
were committing grave abuses and the government 
was refusing to cooperate with the international com-
munity. In the first half of the 2000s, the “new” Tur-
key presented a success story. It was in accession talks 
with the EU, in full cooperation with European insti-
tutions and heading towards more democracy and the 
rule of law. At any rate, the EU and the ECtHR were 
increasingly preoccupied with institutional and politi-
cal challenges and had diminishing resources to spare 
on the Kurdish conflict. Finally, the EU and its member 
states’ heightened interest in counter-terrorism gave 
rise to a new policy cooperation with Turkey, impli-
cating not only the PKK but also the democratic Kurd-
ish movement. 
The Implications of 9/11 on the EU’s Stance 
on Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
The new global order that followed September 11 had 
significant consequences for the EU’s engagement 
with the Kurdish question, particularly with the PKK. 
On 21 September 2001, the European Council declared 
the “fight against terrorism” as a priority objective 
and published a list of “persons, groups and entities 
involved in terrorist acts”.82 The PKK was included in 
the updated list published a year later, on 2 May 
2002.83 Although legal restrictions against the PKK in 
Western Europe go back nearly a decade earlier,84 
82  The Council of the European Union, “Council Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the Applica-
tion of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism”, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, L 344/93 (2001). 
83  The Council of the European Union, “Council Common 
Position 2002/340/CFSP of 2 May 2002 updating Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the Applica-
tion of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism”, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, L 116/75 (2002). 
84  In 1993, the German government banned PKK-affiliated 
what changed after the 9/11 attacks was the emer-
gence of an EU-wide measure, which declared the PKK 
as an international organisation engaged in terror-
ism.85 
For the political representatives of the PKK affiliate 
organisations,86 the listing symbolises the European 
endorsement of Turkey’s official policies on the Kurd-
ish question. Questioning the wisdom and the fairness 
of the listing at a time when the PKK’s unilateral 
ceasefire was in effect, its militants had withdrawn 
beyond the borders and the organisation “was delib-
erating to dissolve itself”,87 the PKK’s political repre-
sentatives in Europe argue that with this decision the 
EU effectively became a proxy in Turkey’s counter-
terrorism policies. The Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) leaders see the listing as the outcome of a bar-
gain between the EU member states and the Turkish 
government, which affected the EU’s engagement in 
the human rights dimension of the Kurdish conflict. 
They mark the decision as the beginning of a new 
period when the EU’s diplomatic and human rights 
delegations ceased their visits to the Kurdish region, 
leaving the Turkish authorities unchecked in their 
political and cultural organisations within its borders due to 
fear of “a spillover effect from the Turkish-Kurdish conflict”. 
Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: 
Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora”, Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs 22, no. 1 (2002): 91–118, here 91. 
85  Prior to that, the UK had declared the PKK a terrorist or-
ganisation on 28 March 2001. Marlies Casier, “Designated 
Terrorists: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its Struggle to 
(Re)Gain Political Legitimacy”, Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 3 
(2010): 393–413, here 399. 
86  Personal communication with Chair of People’s Congress 
of Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL), and former DEP parliamentarian 
Remzi Kartal in Brussels on 11 November 2013. KONGRA-GEL 
is the legislative assembly of the “party complex” constituted 
of several parties and organisations, including the PKK. For a 
description of this complex structure, see Akkaya and Jonger-
den, “The PKK in the 2000s” (see note 32). 
87  Personal communication with Spokesperson of the Foreign 
Affairs Commission of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) 
Songül Karabulut in Brussels on 13 November 2013. The KNK 
is a pan-Kurdistan umbrella organisation established in 1999 
and comprising political parties, individuals and non-govern-
mental organisations from the Kurdish diaspora and all parts 
of Kurdistan. Among its 250 members, there are around 30 
political parties, including the KCK. Ibid. 
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human rights policies and enabling them “to commit 
violations freely”.88 
Strongly refuting these claims, European policy-
makers emphasise that listing an armed insurgency 
engaged in acts of terrorism was, and is, neither a 
political contradiction nor an unconditional form of 
support for the Turkish government. Noting the dis-
tinction between their counter-terrorism and human 
rights policies, they stress their lasting support for the 
Kurds’ democratic struggle for equality, democracy 
and the rule of law. EU officials also refute that their 
institutions ceased diplomatic visits in the Kurdish 
region, reiterating their continued engagement in the 
Kurdish issue. 
It is clear that Kurdish political representatives and 
EU officials have divergent opinions regarding the 
EU’s engagement in the human rights dimension of 
the conflict. Leaving aside the accuracy of the com-
plaints regarding the EU’s physical presence in the 
Kurdish region, the gap between the mutual percep-
tions is evident. As for the EU’s listing of the PKK, 
regardless of the principle behind it, what was intend-
ed as an EU-wide policy targeting the PKK and its 
members in Europe had far wider political implica-
tions in Turkey. The EU’s strong support for Turkey’s 
counter-terrorism policies in the mid-2000s strength-
ened the hand of the government vis-à-vis not only the 
PKK militants but also the non-violent Kurdish oppo-
sition in Turkey, enabling it to disguise its human 
rights violations in the Kurdish region “behind the 
cover of counter-terrorism”.89 
EU-Turkey Relations in Turbulence 
Almost immediately after it had started, the accession 
process virtually halted due to two mutually reinforc-
ing developments: the EU’s growing lack of commit-
ment to Turkey’s membership and Turkey’s obstinacy 
concerning the Cyprus question. The institutional 
overload brought by the EU’s 2004 enlargement trig-
gered a heated debate over further enlargement versus 
deeper integration. This caused the EU to consider 
Turkey’s accession in a new light and to introduce 
“absorption capacity” as a formal criterion in 2005.90 
88  Personal communication with BDP politician and the 
Metropolitan Mayor of Diyarbakır Osman Baydemir in Istan-
bul on 3 October 2013. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Senem Aydın-Düzgit and E.Fuat Keyman, EU-Turkey Rela-
tions and the Stagnation of Turkish Democracy, working paper 
Domestic political debates in several member states91 
linked together the discussions over the EU’s future 
and Turkey’s accession, leading to the announcement 
that the negotiations would be “an open-ended pro-
cess”.92 
In the meantime, Cyprus’ accession and new veto 
power over enlargement (and Turkey’s membership) 
had turned the Cyprus conflict into a stumbling block 
for Turkey’s membership. Despite its original commit-
ment, Turkey refused to open its ports and airports to 
the vessels and flights of the Republic of Cyprus, as 
required by the Association Agreement and its Addi-
tional Protocol of 1970. In response, the EU froze the 
negotiations of eight chapters in 2006.93 The next 
year, following the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, France 
decided to block five chapters94 “on the shaky grounds 
that they were too evidently related to full member-
ship”.95 Such a unilateral decision by a member state 
was unprecedented. But it provided a precedent for 
Cyprus, which followed suit two years later and an-
nounced that it would block the opening of six chap-
ters, including 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) 
and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security).96 Thus, only 
four years after the start of the accession process, 
negotiations over more than half of the EU acquis 
chapters were blocked. As a result, merely 14 out of 
the 35 chapters have been opened since the start of 
the accession talks, only one of which was provision-
no. 2 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2012), 3. 
91  In 2005, the EU’s Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 
popular referenda held in France and the Netherlands, and 
Angela Merkel, who strongly opposed Turkey’s accession, 
came to power in Germany. 
92  Council of the European Union, Enlargement: Accession Nego-
tiations with Turkey: General EU Position, Annex II: Negotiating 
Framework, 12 October 2005. 
93  These eight chapters are: 1-Free Movement of Goods,  
3-Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services,  
9-Financial Services, 11-Agriculture and Rural Development, 
13-Fisheries, 14-Transport Policy, 29-Customs Union and 30-
External Relations. 
94  These were: 11-Agriculture and Rural Development (one of 
the chapters blocked by the European Council), 17-Economic 
and Monetary Policy, 22-Regional Policy and Coordination of 
Structural Instruments, 33-Financial and Budgetary Provi-
sions and 34-Institutions. Following the election of François 
Holland in 2012, France stopped blocking Chapter 22, which 
was opened for negotiations by the EU in autumn 2013. 
95  Nathalie Tocci, The Baffling Short-sightedness in the EU-Turkey-
Cyprus Triangle, Document IAI 1021 (Rome: Istituto Affari 
Internazionali, October 2010), 2. 
96  The remaining four chapters blocked by Cyprus are:  
2-Freedom of Movement for Workers, 15-Energy, 26-Education 
and Culture and 31-Foreign, Security and Defense Policy. 
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ally closed.97 Between July 2010 and October 2013, no 
new chapter was opened. This made “it easy for the 
Turkish Government to say ‘whatever we will do will 
not satisfy the EU’ and to cherry pick from the long 
list of reforms that the EU has demanded those that 
fitted their political agenda.”98 
Although the EU’s engagement in Turkey had 
already lessened after its eastern enlargement, it 
received a serious blow with the Euro crisis, which 
posed a credible threat to the longevity of the Union. 
Caught up in its own crisis, the EU had neither the 
political interest nor the ability to be actively engaged 
in Turkey’s domestic issues, including the Kurdish 
issue. By the same token, Turkey itself seemed no 
longer enthusiastic about joining the EU. The coun-
try’s economic growth – at a time when several EU 
members were dealing with severe financial crises – 
and its increasing engagement in world affairs had 
created a (false) self-confidence on the part of the 
government, leading it to “undervalue” the EU.99 
Less than a decade after the accession talks had 
started, both sides lost their commitment to the pro-
cess. On the other hand, due to its energy and security 
needs and the growing instability in the Middle East, 
the EU did not have an interest in losing its influence 
over Turkey.100 The popular uprisings that brought 
down authoritarian regimes in several Arab countries 
put Turkey on the spot as a predominantly Muslim, 
yet secular and democratic, country and a viable 
foreign policy partner for the EU in the Middle East. 
The establishment of the European External Action 
97  The chapters opened for negotiations are the following:  
4-Free Movement of Capital, 6-Company Law, 7-Intellectual 
Property Law, 10-Information Society and Media, 12-Food 
Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy, 16-Taxation, 18-
Statistics, 20-Enterprise and Industrial Policy, 21-Trans-Euro-
pean Networks, 22-Regional Policy and Coordination of Struc-
tural Instruments, 25-Science and Research (provisionally 
closed), 27-Environment, 28-Consumer and Health Protection 
and 32-Financial Control.  
98  Personal communication with former Member of the 
European Parliament Joost Lagendijk in Istanbul on 5 October 
2013. 
99  Personal communication with EU official-3 on 3 October 
2013. 
100  The EU’s interest in Turkey as a potential security part-
ner was the principal reason for it to consider the latter’s 
membership in the 1960s. The Union’s interest in Turkey as 
a partner in energy security, on the other hand, dates back 
to the late 1990s. Şaban Kardaş, “Geo-strategic Position as 
Leverage in EU Accession: The Case of Turkish-EU Negotia-
tions on the Nabucco Pipeline”, Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies 11, no. 1 (March 2011): 35–52. 
Service in December 2010 provided the institutional 
framework for deeper foreign policy cooperation with 
Turkey. 
The accession process started to be “more contextu-
alized and become part of a broader Turkey-EU rela-
tionship”.101 The European Parliament started to em-
phasise “the potential of close EU-Turkey relations” in 
the Black Sea, Central Asia and the broader Middle 
East regions,102 and Turkey’s significance as a growing 
economy, an important trade partner for the EU, 
“source of inspiration for democratising Arab States” 
and “a major EU energy corridor for Caucasian and 
Caspian oil and gas resources”.103 
This spirit of cooperation, however, did not last 
long. It had soon become clear that transition to 
democratic rule was not a given in many of the Arab 
countries where autocratic regimes were brought 
down by popular uprisings. Furthermore, any pros-
pect for Turkey to be an inspiration for countries 
ruled by authoritarian regimes was fast diminishing, 
particularly during the third term of the Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan government. Finally, with the AKP govern-
ment’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy in the 
Middle East, it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
find common ground. When divergences became all 
the more clear over Egypt and Syria, the EU started 
to exercise restraint in its assessment of the AKP’s in-
volvement in the region, calling on Turkey to “progres-
sively align its foreign policy with that of the EU”.104 
The Cycle of Reforms, War and 
Politics in Turkey 
As in the Turgut Özal era, the AKP government’s poli-
cies on the Kurdish question oscillated between 
granting the Kurds limited rights on the one hand and 
enhancing the powers of counter-terrorism agencies 
on the other. Whereas the former was largely trig-
gered by foreign policy considerations, the latter was 
101  An EU official speaking at a roundtable discussion in 
Brussels under Chatham House rules. 
102  European Parliament, 2009 Progress Report on Turkey: Reso-
lution of 10 February 2010 on Turkey’s Progress Report 2009 (2010), 
para. 46. 
103  European Parliament, Enlargement Report for Turkey: Reso-
lution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey 
(2012), para. H–J. 
104  European Parliament, Enlargement Report for Turkey: Reso-
lution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey 
(2012), para. 58. 
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driven by domestic factors such as the AKP’s ambition 
to be re-elected in 2007, the nationalist reactions to 
the reform process and the security forces’ complaints 
that the reforms curtailed their counter-terrorism 
efforts.105 
Between the EU’s 2004 Copenhagen summit and 
the next elections in Turkey, Parliament adopted a 
new Penal Code, and amended the Anti-Terror Law 
and the Law on the Duties and Authority of the Police, 
effectively rolling back many of the earlier reforms. 
The revised Anti-Terror Law, which required the pros-
ecution of minors over the age of 15 in “heavy penal 
courts” with special powers instead of juvenile courts, 
led to thousands of Kurdish minors being put on trial 
merely for participating in pro-PKK demonstrations or 
celebrations.106 The new criminal laws allowed politi-
cal dissidents to be charged with terrorism offences 
with aggravated sentences, while the enhanced powers 
given to law enforcement officers led to a drastic 
increase in the use of disproportionate force by the 
police against peaceful protestors. 
The security situation in the Kurdish region was 
rapidly deteriorating. In June 2004, the PKK resumed 
fighting upon expiration of the ceasefire it had de-
clared following Öcalan’s capture in 1999.107 The 
105  As discussed earlier, the EU’s ambivalent approach and 
the increasing opposition of various EU member states to 
Turkey’s accession also played a role in diminishing the 
political will and ability of the AKP government to further 
the reform process. 
106  The first public protests where Kurdish minors partici-
pated in mass numbers took place on 28–29 March 2006 in 
Diyarbakır after the funeral of 14 PKK fighters killed by secu-
rity forces. The police used disproportionate power, killing 
10 civilians, including minors. The incidents sparked mass 
riots in the region and expedited the adoption of restrictive 
amendments to the Anti-Terror Law on 29 June 2006. In 2006 
alone, 304 minors were taken into custody on the grounds of 
having committed “crimes of terrorism” and 719 were pros-
ecuted. UNICEF, Field Visit Report on Children Deemed to be Terror-
ist Offenders for Participating in Demonstrations (2010), 6, http:// 
www.bianet.org/system/uploads/1/files/attachments/000/000/1 
05/original/kitap_tamam%C4%B1.pdf. In response to protests, 
the Anti-Terrorism Law was revised in 2010 to require the 
prosecution of minors in juvenile courts and allow the post-
ponement or reduction of their sentences. 
107  The reasons for the PKK’s resumption of violence at the 
peak of the EU-induced reforms in Turkey are not entirely 
clear. Some studies argue that amidst internal developments 
(the pro-Kurdish party’s losing votes in the 2004 local elec-
tions) and external developments (the autonomous Kurdish 
region in Iraq made possible by the US invasion in 2003), the 
PKK’s military wing wanted to make itself relevant once again 
as a key political actor. Akkaya and Jongerden, “The PKK in 
funerals of military conscripts killed in combat turned 
into platforms for anti-AKP protests. Capitalising on 
this social unrest, the Turkish armed forces and the 
opposition parties accused the government of giving 
concessions to the PKK. In response – in consideration 
of the approaching elections – the government adopt-
ed a hard line. Security forces started routinely stop-
ping civilians, executing house raids without warrants 
and enforcing arbitrary restrictions of freedoms of 
association and assembly. In October 2007, the Turk-
ish Parliament approved cross-border military opera-
tions against PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Meanwhile, making use of its growing political 
power, the Kurdish political movement started to 
push the boundaries of the EU-induced reforms and 
press for collective rights. The DTP politicians aggres-
sively pursued Öcalan’s democratic confederalism 
project108 through civil disobedience campaigns. In 
defiance of the laws banning the official use of Kurd-
ish, the DTP/BDP mayors started to provide municipal 
services and carry out official correspondence in 
Kurdish, reinsert the Kurdish names of places and 
use their resources for the development and spread 
of the Kurdish language.109 
Revised Criminal Laws at Work: The KCK Cases 
These policies rendered the DTP/BDP deputies and 
mayors the targets of judicial harassment. The author-
ities engaged in continuous attempts to prosecute the 
pro-Kurdish deputies110 and prevent their re-election.111 
the 2000s” (see note 32), 154. Others cite the PKK’s frustration 
amid the Turkish government’s “complacency toward reach-
ing a negotiated settlement”. International Crisis Group, 
Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency, Crisis Group Europe Report 
213 (20 September 2011), 4. 
108  Developed by Öcalan in prison as part of his legal defence, 
democratic confederalism seeks “democratic self-govern-
ment” by the Kurds through local councils, parliaments and 
congresses to be established across Kurdistan. Akkaya and 
Jongerden, “The PKK in the 2000s” (see note 32), 152–153. It 
is the ideological and political basis of the DTP/BDP’s “democ-
ratic autonomy project”, which advocates the radical decen-
tralisation of governance in Turkey and the transfer of com-
petences in certain areas, such as education and culture, 
from the central government to elected regional assemblies. 
109  Opening public kindergartens providing education in 
Kurdish; organising Kurdish conferences and festivals; offer-
ing free Kurdish language courses; and publishing Kurdish 
dictionaries, children’s books and cookbooks are only some 
of the municipal policies in the area of language rights. 
110  For examples, see the European Commission reports. 
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In addition to the bureaucratic obstruction of their 
day-to-day work, the municipal officials faced “judicial 
coercion”.112 The peak of these efforts has been the 
KCK cases,113 in which DTP/BDP politicians are charged 
with holding leadership positions or membership in 
the Union of Communities in Kurdistan/Turkey Assem-
bly (KCK/TM), which is the leg of “an international 
project” controlled by the PKK and comprised of sister 
parties in Iraq, Syria and Iran that seeks to establish 
“an independent state structure”.114 The basis of the 
indictments is the revised Anti-Terror Law, which 
allows the characterisation of advocating the same 
demands as the PKK to be defined as terrorist propa-
ganda. This legal framework enabled the prosecutors 
to charge Kurdish rights activists, lawyers and elected 
municipal officials with KCK/PKK membership simply 
for demanding, through non-violent means, mother 
tongue education and autonomy for the Kurds.115 The 
number of defendants in pre-trial detention reached 
thousands, marking yet another turning point in the 
conflict.116 
111  The most striking attempt to exclude members of the 
Kurdish national movement from parliament took place on 
the eve of the 2011 elections. The Supreme Election Board 
vetoed seven of the BDP-endorsed independent candidates 
due to their past convictions on terrorism charges. The 
mounting protests across the country caused the Board to 
reverse its decision soon after. 
112  Watts, Activists in Office (see note 5), 113–120. Osman 
Baydemir, former metropolitan mayor of Diyarbakır, alone 
faced 28 court cases between 2004 and 2008. Ibid., 115. 
113  The KCK cases came to public attention with the arrest 
in Diyarbakır of 53 Kurds, including elected on-duty mayors, 
on 14 April 2009, two weeks after the local elections in which 
the DTP swept the elections in the region. 
114  KCK indictment, cited in Fikret İlkiz, “KCK Cases and 
the Judiciary Mechanism”, Perspectives-Political Analysis and 
Commentary from Turkey, no. 2 (October 2012): 41–45. The KCK 
was indeed established by the PKK to put into effect Öcalan’s 
concept of “democratic confederalism”. It brings together 
political parties, civil society organisations and armed groups 
affiliated with the PKK in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. “In the 
PKK party complex, the KCK can be considered the executive 
body.” Akkaya and Jongerden, “The PKK in the 2000s” (see 
note 32), 159. 
115  The evidence cited against these individuals include: 
participating in mass demonstrations during Kurdish New 
Year celebrations, on World’s Women’s Day and Human 
Rights Day; citing in their news articles the PKK leaders and/ 
or PKK’s written materials; and even filing petitions with the 
ECtHR. 
116  On 14 April 2009, in response to a parliamentary query, 
the Minister of Justice stated that in 113 cases launched as 
part of the KCK investigation across the country, a total of 
2,146 defendants were being tried, 992 of whom were held in 
Although the AKP, years later, would blame the 
targeted prosecution of Kurdish politicians on the 
followers of the Fethullah Gülen movement,117 who 
were “placed into” police intelligence units and the 
heavy penal court system, senior government officials, 
including the prime minister, defended the arrests at 
the time on the ground that defendants were PKK 
activists in disguise. Mindful of this history, Kurdish 
politicians do not attribute sole responsibility for the 
KCK cases to the Gülen movement and believe that 
the operations were “carried out through a state-wide 
consensus” based on a military strategy aimed at 
eradicating the PKK.118 Yet, the arrests produced the 
opposite result, “exponentially” increasing the number 
of recruits to the PKK.119 The Constitutional Court’s 
dissolution of the DTP in December 2009 eliminated 
any remaining hopes for a peaceful settlement and 
tipped the balance of power in favour of the PKK and 
against democratic Kurdish politics. 
On the Road to Peace? The AKP-Öcalan Talks 
The lockup of thousands of Kurdish politicians and 
the dissolution of the DTP gave rise to a new, and 
much more heightened, wave of violence at the turn 
of the decade. Another factor was the failure of the 
AKP’s short-lived “Kurdish opening”, which the gov-
ernment quietly abandoned soon after its launch in 
2009. The sole legal outcomes of this initiative were 
the launch of 24-hour public broadcasting in Kurdish 
and the establishment of Kurdish institutes and de-
partments at select universities.120 The conflict 
pre-trial detention. İlkiz, “KCK Cases and the Judiciary Mecha-
nism” (see note 114), 43. 
117  Widely known as “the Gülenists”, the movement started 
as a Turkish religious community led by a Muslim preacher 
named Fethullah Gülen and transformed into a “national and 
international player”. For more on the Gülen movement and 
its role in the KCK case, see Günter Seufert, Is the Fethullah 
Gülen Movement Overstretching Itself`? A Turkish Religious Commu-
nity as a National and International Player, SWP Research Paper 
2/2014 (Berlin, January 2014). 
118  Personal communication with BDP politician Fırat Anlı 
in Diyarbakır on 2 October 2013. Anlı is the former mayor 
of the Yenişehir district of Diyarbakır. On 30 March 2014, he 
was elected as the co-mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Mu-
nicipality. 
119  Ibid. 
120  What has led the AKP letting its “opening” die down is 
the nationalist backlash caused by the “peace envoys” sent by 
the PKK from across the border in support of the government 
initiative and a sign of future intentions to lay down arms if 
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entered one of its deadliest phases, with the PKK 
staging a series of fatal attacks against military 
targets.121 
There was a growing realisation within the govern-
ment about the futility of a “law and order” approach, 
particularly after the PKK’s deadly attacks in the sum-
mer. Furthermore, the persistent Kurdish question 
posed a credible threat to Erdoğan’s plans of ruling 
Turkey under a presidential system. Regional develop-
ments also made a peaceful resolution inevitable. The 
power vacuum created by the civil war in Syria gave 
rise to de facto Kurdish self-rule in the north (Western 
Kurdistan, or Rojava) under the leadership of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is ideologically, 
politically and militarily linked to the PKK.122 
Against this background, the government (re)com-
menced peace talks with the PKK. This time, as op-
posed to the “Oslo Process”, carried out with the PKK 
leadership with mediation from a third party in 
Europe, the talks would take place directly with Öcalan. 
A recent turn of events might have influenced this 
decision. In September 2012, 63 prisoners initiated 
one of the largest hunger strikes in Turkey’s history 
in response to the courts’ refusal to allow the KCK 
defendants to conduct their defence in Kurdish. With-
in weeks, the number of strikers reached 682,123 who 
demanded improvements in Öcalan’s prison condi-
tions, the right to education in Kurdish and the right 
to use Kurdish in courts. The duration of the strike 
and when a peaceful settlement is reached. The euphoric 
greeting of eight unarmed PKK militants (and 26 refugees 
who came along from the UNHCR-run Mahmur camp in Iraqi 
Kurdistan) at the border crossing by tens of thousands of 
Kurds from Turkey and the DTP-organised celebrations across 
the Kurdish region in the following days led to counter-
demonstrations in the rest of the country by Turkish nation-
alists who opposed the AKP’s initiative as treason. These 
reactions led to the prosecution of four of the PKK militants 
and six of the refugees on terrorism charges and led to the 
remaining 24 quietly returning to Iraqi Kurdistan thereafter. 
Cengiz Çandar, ‘Leaving the Mountain’: How May the PKK Lay 
Down Arms? Freeing the Kurdish Question from Violence (TESEV, 
Istanbul, 2012), 80. 
121  Principal among these attacks were the killing of 20 sol-
diers in two separate attacks carried out by the PKK in May 
and July 2011. 
122  For more on the Syrian civil war and Turkey’s policy 
therein, see Muriel Asseburg, “Syria’s Civil War: Geopolitical 
Implications and Scenarios”, Mediterranean Yearbook (2013), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fach 
publikationen/AsseburgSyriaMediterraneanYearbook 2013.pdf. 
123  The number is based on the announcement made by the 
Ministry of Justice on 2 November 2012. 
and the participation of BDP deputies increased its 
public profile, forcing the government to start draft-
ing a law to allow the use of Kurdish in courts.124 The 
hunger strikes abruptly ended in response to Öcalan’s 
call, demonstrating his supremacy over the Kurdish 
movement. 
The unofficial talks started soon after and bore first 
fruit when Öcalan delivered his historic message to 
the Kurdish people on 31 March 2013, announcing the 
end of the armed insurrection. The PKK responded by 
announcing an indefinite ceasefire and commencing 
the withdrawal of its fighters beyond the borders.125 
Despite this promising start, it soon became clear that 
the government and the Kurdish national movement 
had divergent expectations. For the government, the 
ultimate aim was the cessation of the armed conflict 
and for the PKK to lay down its arms. For both the PKK 
and the BDP, the goal was a political settlement based, 
for the short and medium term, on structural legal 
reforms that granted the Kurds political status and, 
for the longer term, on the disarmament and reinte-
gration of PKK militants.126 Following the PKK’s cease-
fire declaration, the ball was now in the court of the 
government. It responded with a “democratisation 
package”, which, although it expanded on linguistic 
rights granted prior, it nonetheless failed to meet key 
Kurdish demands, such as public education in Kurd-
ish, the lowering of the electoral threshold and the 
abolishment or revision of the Anti-Terror Law.127 
The peace talks between the AKP and Öcalan have 
become the platform where the Kurds’ long-standing 
124  The law was eventually adopted on 24 January 2013, 
granting defendants a limited right of oral defence in “an-
other language” other than Turkish during the reading of the 
indictment and in response to the substantive allegations. 
Defendants are required to bear the costs themselves. The law 
entered into effect with its publication in the Official Gazette 
on 31 January 2013. 
125  For more on the peace process, see Michael Werz and 
Max Hoffman, The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions: 
The Peace Process in Context (Center for American Progress, July 
2014); Kevin Matthees and Günter Seufert, Erdoğan and Öcalan 
Begin Talks: A Paradigm Shift in Turkey’s Kurdish Policy and a New 
Strategy of the PKK, SWP Comments 13/2013 (Berlin, April 2013). 
126  Although the courts, seemingly instructed by the Minis-
try of Justice, released a few Kurdish mayors, including Fırat 
Anlı, in early March 2013 – and a number of lawyers, journal-
ists and activists in subsequent months – thousands of other 
KCK defendants remain in prison. 
127  For an analysis of the package from the perspective of 
the Kurdish demands, see Dilek Kurban, Not a Roadmap for 
Peace: Erdoğan’s Democratisation Package Defies Kurdish Expecta-
tions, SWP Comments 35/2013 (Berlin, November 2013). 
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human rights claims – along with their more recent 
political demands for autonomy – are being negoti-
ated. Thus, once linked to the EU process, recognition 
of the Kurds’ democratic demands has become contin-
gent on the progress of informal and unstructured 
peace talks, whose future remains obscure amidst 
volatile political situations in Turkey and the wider 
Middle East. Once prepared under the guidance of the 
European Commission’s progress reports and the 
ECtHR rulings, the reforms are now tuned to the pro-
gress made in the negotiations with Öcalan. 
The EU’s Engagement in the Kurdish Issue in 
the Accession Era 
From the EU’s perspective – albeit limited in scope and 
slow in pace – the progress Turkey has made in democ-
ratisation has been remarkable. Although the AKP 
was selective in following the EU’s demands, it was 
“willing to listen and to move in a certain direction”.128 
The military’s overt opposition to the AKP was another 
factor in the EU’s support.129 Although the reforms 
had, by and large, halted by the mid-2000s, the EU 
stood behind the Turkish government out of principle 
(an EU-oriented government should not be left alone 
in its struggle against military tutelage), necessity (the 
lack of a viable and desirable alternative to the AKP in 
Turkey) and convenience (the EU was busy with its 
own post-enlargement institutional problems). 
The dynamics between the EU, the Kurdish national 
movement and the Turkish government were chang-
ing fast by the mid-2000s. The European Parliament, 
while remaining critical of official government poli-
cies, called on the DTP deputies and mayors to “dis-
tance themselves clearly” from the PKK.130 The decisive 
factor in the adoption of this language was the PKK’s 
resorting to violence once again, which led Parliament 
to “draw a clear line between the elected politicians 
and the PKK” and to exclusively engage with the for-
mer.131 Certainly, the PKK’s resumption of armed 
hostilities required European policymakers to take a 
128  Lagendijk on 5 October 2013 (see note 98). 
129  The highlight of this opposition was the Chief of Staff’s 
failed attempt to preclude the election of Abdullah Gül to 
the presidential office by issuing an ultimatum to the gov-
ernment on 27 April 2007. 
130  European Parliament, Turkey’s 2007 Progress Report: Reso-
lution of 21 May 2008 on Turkey’s 2007 Progress Report (2008), para. 
13. 
131  Lagendijk on 5 October 2013 (see note 98). 
firm stand against the continued use of violence as a 
means of political struggle. On the other hand, by 
adopting the political rhetoric prevalent in govern-
ment and nationalist circles in Turkey at the time,132 
Parliament effectively joined the harassment cam-
paign, which portrayed DTP politicians as PKK mili-
tants in disguise and led to the dissolution of the DTP 
by the Constitutional Court in 2009. The European 
Commission reacted to the ruling as a “serious setback 
to the government’s efforts at democratic opening”.133 
However, in portraying the dissolution as a judicial 
measure, the Commission overlooked the fact that it 
was made possible by a legal framework kept intact 
by the AKP. Moreover, the Commission’s reaction was 
not even close to the strong protest it has shown over 
the dissolution of the AKP, which an EU official called 
“almost a coup attempt”.134 The DTP’s dissolution, on 
the other hand, was business as usual, since it “de facto 
would not harm the Kurds because they would create 
another party”.135 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of the changing 
times was the EU’s belated reaction to the KCK cases. 
It was only in 2011 that the Commission explicitly 
criticised the 2006 revisions in the Anti-Terror Law 
and assessed the arrest of Kurdish politicians as “a 
challenge for local government”.136 In accounting for 
the time lag, an EU official said that “in the context 
of the post-9/11 period”, the KCK operation was “sold 
to [the EU] as a big anti-terrorist operation [against] 
a clandestine structure in Turkey all linked to PKK”.137 
This, however, was by no means a new argument 
voiced by the Turkish government. In essence, it is 
similar to the portrayal of DEP deputies as PKK agents 
in the 1990s, which at the time did not prevent EU 
institutions from strongly condemning the arrests of 
elected Kurdish politicians who were engaged in non-
violent democratic opposition to official policies. It 
was the EU governments’ uncritical acceptance of the 
same argument with respect to the DTP/BDP politi-
cians that kept them from following the KCK case by 
observing trials, a practice they frequently resorted 
to in the 1990s.138 Nonetheless, after a while, the Com-
132  The most symbolic and vivid symbol of the DTP’s pariah 
status was the prime minister’s refusal to shake the hands of 
the DTP deputies. 
133  European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report (2010), 8.  
134  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
135  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
136  European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report (2011), 11. 
137  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
138  A large number of delegations from Europe that were 
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mission revisited its initial assessments about the KCK 
case, concluding that “it was clearly over the top” and 
was not justified “solely on the account of the fight 
against terrorism”.139 
By the time the Commission started to criticise the 
judicial persecution of Kurdish politicians, however, 
the EU had lost much of its leverage over Turkey, due 
to the halting of the accession process and the consoli-
dation of the AKP’s power. The EU’s declining political 
influence and moral power over Turkey was evident in 
the reception of its growing criticisms in government 
circles. The Commission’s 2012 progress report, which 
marked the first time the EU publicly expressed strong 
criticism of the AKP, was dismissed by the party lead-
ers as being “biased”.140 When the EU went beyond 
mere criticism and threatened to take concrete action, 
however, the continuation of its power over the Turk-
ish government became evident. The European Coun-
cil’s decision to postpone the opening of Chapter 22, 
originally planned for June 2013, in protest of the 
police brutality displayed in the Gezi protests, alarmed 
the AKP leaders, who pled for EU leaders to reconsider 
their decision.141 The incident showed not only that 
the accession process still matters for Turkey, but also 
that the EU still retains a degree of leverage over the 
government. 
The ECtHR in Crisis 
The CoE’s rapid eastbound expansion after the end of 
the Cold War worsened the docket crisis of the ECtHR, 
which now had 800 million potential applicants in 47 
states. The situation led to the initiation of a reform 
process to render the ECHR system more efficient. One 
of these reforms, the pilot judgment mechanism,142 
implicated in particular Kurdish victims’ access to 
Strasbourg.143 In Doğan, a pilot judgment issued in a 
planning to attend the first KCK hearing on 18 October 2010 
changed their minds at the last minute when Turkish govern-
ment officials told the embassies in Ankara that their attend-
ance would not be appreciated. Anlı on 2 October 2013 (see 
note 118). 
139  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
140  Most symbolically, a senior AKP politician threw the 
progress report into the trash bin in front of press cameras. 
141  After much consideration, the EU decided to open Chap-
ter 22 in the autumn. 
142  The first pilot judgment was issued against Poland. 
ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland (Grand Chamber), Application no. 
31443/96, 22 June 2004. 
143  Dilek Kurban, “Shattered Hopes: When the European 
displacement case, the Court identified, for the first 
time, internal displacement as being a systemic and 
structural problem in Turkey and called for the adop-
tion of policies to address it.144 The ruling led the gov-
ernment to expedite the adoption of a compensation 
law for the displaced in order to win an inadmissibil-
ity decision to enable the domestic settlement of the 
remaining 1,500 applications and strengthen the 
chances of a favourable EU decision regarding acces-
sion. 
The period after Doğan witnessed concerted efforts 
by the Turkish government to make an exemplary 
implementation of the law.145 These efforts paid off 
and the ECtHR, in an inadmissibility decision in the 
case of İçyer, found the compensation law to be an 
effective domestic remedy and rejected all pending 
applications.146 For the displaced Kurds and their 
lawyers, the road to Strasbourg, while in theory still 
open, was effectively closed. For the government, 
the decision saved millions of Euros in compensation 
and repaired its tarnished international reputation. 
In reality, in limiting compensation to pecuniary 
losses and the state’s liability to civil remedies, the 
Turkish law falls far below ECtHR standards. Prior to 
the law, the Court had compensated the displaced for 
their emotional suffering and emphasised that an 
“effective remedy” should entail the identification and 
prosecution of perpetrators. Furthermore, by prema-
turely passing judgment on a new mechanism, the 
ECtHR removed any incentive for Turkey to properly 
apply the law. Indeed, after İçyer, the administrative 
commissions tasked with implementing the law 
slowed down their work, rejected a high number of 
petitions and lowered the compensation amounts.147 
And yet, in 2008, the Committee of Ministers closed its 
Court of Human Rights Shuts Its Doors to the Kurdish Dis-
placed”, Perspectives on Europe, no. 1, special issue, “Justice and 
Unfairness: Ethics of Law and Power in Europe” (Spring 2014): 
24–30. 
144  ECtHR, Doğan v. Turkey, Applications nos. 8803–8811/02, 
8813/02 and 8815–8819/02, 29 June 2004. Quite unusually, 
the ECtHR retroactively labelled Doğan as a pilot judgment in 
İçyer, an inadmissibility decision it issued two years later. 
ECtHR, İçyer v. Turkey, Application no. 18888/02, 12 January 
2006. 
145  The commissions tasked with implementing the law 
were instructed by the government to speedily process the 
applications and to award high compensation amounts. 
Kurban and Yeğen, On the Verge of Justice (see note 19). 
146  ECtHR, İçyer (see note 144). 
147  Dilek Kurban et al., Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: 
Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey (Istan-
bul, August 2007). 
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examination of the issue based on Turkey’s assurances 
that there were a wide range of remedies available to 
the victims.148 These assurances proved to be unjusti-
fied; the Turkish courts routinely approved the deci-
sions of the commissions and the Constitutional Court 
refrained from exercising judicial review over the 
law.149 
Nonetheless, Kurdish lawyers continued to apply to 
Strasbourg. They have brought before the ECtHR novel 
issues pertaining to collective and cultural rights, push-
ing the boundaries of the Convention. The Court’s 
stance in these cases has been mixed, and at times 
inconsistent. It ruled in favour of Turkey’s 10 per cent 
threshold, which had excluded from parliament the 
pro-Kurdish political parties, which received 4 to 6 per 
cent of the votes nationwide in the three general elec-
tions they participated in between 1995 and 2002. 
While acknowledging that this was the highest thresh-
old in Europe, the ECtHR held that member states 
have broad leeway on this matter owing to the politi-
cal nature of electoral rights and the lack of a com-
mon European standard.150 The Court also upheld 
Turkey’s ban on the official use of the Kurdish letters 
x, q and w, finding the requirement to transliterate 
Kurdish names to the Turkish alphabet not to be a 
violation of the Convention.151 It did not take note of 
the fact that the ban is not limited to the use of these 
letters in names, but has systematically been used by 
the Turkish authorities to prosecute mayors for using 
the Kurdish alphabet in official correspondence.152 
In some cases, the ECtHR noted the incoherence in 
Turkey’s legal framework on language rights. It found 
the government’s attempt to dissolve a trade union 
whose by-laws advocated the right to public education 
in the mother tongue to be in violation of the freedom 
of association and expression, noting the contradic-
tion in the dissolution case launched against the 
union and the Turkish Parliament’s decision in 2002 
to allow private courses for the teaching of minority 
languages.153 In a case concerning the conviction of 
148  Committee of Ministers, Resolution on the Execution of the 
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Doğan and Others 
against Turkey, CM/ResDH(2008)60 (2008). 
149  Kurban and Yeğen, On the Verge of Justice (see note 19). 
150  ECtHR, Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey (Grand Chamber), Appli-
cation no. 10226/03, 8 July 2008 (upholding the initial Cham-
ber judgment of 30 January 2007). 
151  ECtHR, Kemal Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 
30206/04, 37038/04, 43681/04, 45376/04, 12881/05, 28697/05, 
32797/05 and 45609/05, 2 February 2010. 
152  Anlı on 2 October 2013 (see note 118). 
153  ECtHR, Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, Appli-
five Kurdish politicians for having spoken Kurdish in 
their political activities and election campaigns, the 
Court found the blanket prohibition of the use of 
unofficial languages coupled with criminal sanctions 
to be in violation of freedom of expression laws.154 
While pointing out the tensions in Turkey’s legal 
framework, the Court at times created inconsistencies 
in its own jurisprudence. It refused to hear a case con-
cerning the dissolution of the municipal council and 
the dismissal of the mayor of the Sur district of Diyar-
bakır by a Turkish court on the basis of the municipal-
ity’s decision to provide public services in Kurdish, 
Armenian, Syriac, English and Arabic.155 In a majority 
decision, the ECtHR declared the case to be inadmissi-
ble.156 If the attempt to dissolve a trade union merely 
because it advocates education in the mother tongue 
is a violation of the Convention, it is difficult to see 
why the ECtHR did not address a case concerning the 
government’s removal from office of an elected coun-
cil and mayor who decided to provide multilingual 
municipal services. After all, the union and the mu-
nicipal officials were similarly engaged in civil dis-
obedience by violating the laws that ban the advocacy 
of minority rights for an officially unrecognised lan-
guage. The distinctions the Court drew between the 
ban on the use of Kurdish in political activities (which 
is not permissible) and the ban on the use of names 
with Kurdish letters (which is permissible) are difficult 
to justify in light of the fact that language is a unified 
entity that includes both its spoken and written forms. 
The ECtHR’s stance on the Sur case also stands in 
contrast to the position adopted by other CoE bodies. 
In 2007, the Congress of Local and Regional Author-
ities of Europe (the Congress) undertook a fact-finding 
mission specifically to investigate the Sur case,157 on 
cation no. 20641/05, 25 September 2012. 
154  ECtHR, Case of Şükran Aydın and Others v. Turkey, Applica-
tion no. 49197/06, 23196/07, 50242/08, 60912/08 and 14871/ 
09, 22 January 2013. 
155  The government had replaced the dismissed elected 
mayor, Abdullah Demirbaş, with an appointed bureaucrat, 
who held the position for two years, although the law re-
quired the holding of new elections within six months. In 
2009, Demirbaş was re-elected to the same position by receiv-
ing 65.3 per cent of the votes. 
156  ECtHR, Abdullah Demirbaş and Others v. Turkey, Application 
no. 1093/08, 301/08, 303/08 et al., 9 November 2010 (available 
in English). 
157  The Bureau of the Congress, Local Democracy in Turkey: 
Situation in Sur/Diyarbakır (South-East Anatolia, Turkey), Report of 
the Congress Fact-Finding Mission to Turkey, 8–10 August 
2007. 
SWP Berlin 
The Role of the European Court of Human Rights  
and the EU in Turkey’s Kurdish Policies 
October 2014 
 
 
26 
 
 
The ECtHR in Crisis 
the basis of which it called on the Turkish government 
to “permit municipal councils to use languages other 
than Turkish in the provision of public services when 
appropriate.”158 Expressing “particular concern” for 
the dismissal of the mayor and the dissolution of the 
municipal council, the CoE’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights noted that “this repressive measure against 
local authorities was not an isolated incident but ap-
pears to be part of a generalized practice in the area 
of Diyarbakir.”159 
When it comes to conventional cases raising first-
generation rights, however, the ECtHR ruled in accord-
ance with its precedents. In two recent rulings con-
cerning the indiscriminate killings of Kurdish civil-
ians in the name of counter-terrorism, the Court ruled 
against the Turkish government. The cases concerned 
the killing of 38 civilians in an aerial bombardment160 
and the killing of a 12-year-old boy and his father by 
special police squad units in front of their home.161 
The Court’s rulings show that the regime of impunity 
that shields civilian and security agents of the govern-
ment has remained intact since the AKP came to 
power and undertook human rights reforms handed 
down by the EU. In the first case, although the inci-
dents occurred in 1994, the investigations that the 
ECtHR found to be inadequate were carried out during 
the AKP government’s term; in the second, the vio-
lations took place in 2004, one month before the EU 
had decided to start accession talks with the AKP 
government. 
 
 
158  The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Local 
Democracy in Turkey, Recommendation 229 (2007), 21 Novem-
ber 2007. 
159  Council of Europe, Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commis-
sioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit 
to Turkey on 28 June – 3 July 2009 (Strasbourg, 1 October 2009), 
paragraphs 39 and 40. 
160  ECtHR, Benzer and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 23502/ 
06, 12 November 2013. 
161  ECtHR, Makbule Kaymaz and Others v. Turkey, Application 
no. 651/10, 25 February 2014. 
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The Dynamics of Limited European 
Engagement and Impact 
There is no question that Turkey has made significant 
progress in addressing the Kurdish issue and, to a 
certain extent, acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
Kurds’ demands for equal treatment and democratic 
participation. The role that European institutions 
have played in this political transition is also undeni-
able. Compared to the 1990s, the country has come a 
long way in alleviating the human rights problems 
underscored by the ECtHR and the EU. Once banned 
from speaking their language, the Kurds can now 
learn in their mother tongue at public schools, watch 
publicly funded Kurdish broadcasting and even attain 
university education in their language. The Kurdish 
region is no longer governed by a state of emergency, 
nor are Kurdish civilians summarily executed by plain-
clothes state officials in broad daylight or disappear-
ing after being taking into detention facilities. 
At the same time, an assessment of progress is con-
tingent on one’s reference point. For a country that 
has been engaged with the European Convention 
system for more than half a century and in the EU 
accession process for a decade, Turkey is far behind in 
European human rights standards. In many respects, 
there has been an uninterrupted continuity in Tur-
key’s laws and policies governing the Kurdish conflict. 
No attempt has been made to abolish, or even dimin-
ish, the village guard system, even after the initiation 
of the peace talks. The special legal regime governing 
counter-terrorism remains in force, enabling the con-
tinued selective targeting of Kurdish politicians and 
activists. The non-violent advocacy of enhanced rights 
for the Kurds still provides legal grounds for terrorism 
charges. The regime of impunity shielding state offi-
cials who commit human rights violations in the 
Kurdish region remains intact.162 
162  The CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights recently 
alluded to the impunity of law enforcement officials as “a 
very serious, long-standing human rights issue in Turkey”. 
Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Turkey 
from 1 to 5 July 2013 (Strasbourg, 26 November 2013), 2. 
To some extent, European institutions’ incoherent 
and uncritical oversight in a number of issues has 
facilitated Turkey’s reluctance to go through genuine 
democratic transition. The ECtHR, for example, has 
refrained from concluding that the atrocities commit-
ted by the Turkish security forces in the Kurdish region 
in the 1990s were standard administrative practice, 
enabling the government to frame the abuses as isolat-
ed incidents of malpractice. Similarly, it systematical-
ly dismissed Kurdish applicants’ claims of ethnic dis-
crimination, though the discriminatory nature of 
government policies was evident. Certainly, the Court’s 
reluctance to support the provision of public services 
in Kurdish is understandable, given the absence of 
common European norms and approaches on what is 
considered to be a collective right and a political issue. 
However, its unwillingness to review the dismissal 
and dissolution of a democratically elected mayor and 
municipal council on the basis of their decision to 
provide public services in Kurdish is difficult to recon-
cile with the Court’s mandate to uphold the political 
rights protected under the European Convention. 
Similarly, in extending unconditional support for 
Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies after 9/11, the EU 
and its members failed to see the implications of what 
was intended to be an anti-PKK measure for the non-
violent democratic Kurdish opposition in Turkey. 
There is a sharp contrast between the EU’s reaction 
to the prosecution of DEP deputies in the 1990s and 
that of the DTP/BDP politicians in the 2000s. Finally, 
the EU’s exceptional treatment of Turkey’s candidacy 
removed any incentive for the AKP government to 
bind itself to European norms. 
Diminishing European oversight virtually gave the 
Turkish government a free hand in domestic policies. 
At the national level, this led to the arrest of a record 
number of journalists, the prosecution of thousands 
for the non-violent expression of dissent and the use of 
excessive force in the policing of demonstrations. In 
the Kurdish region, a de facto exceptional legal regime 
became operational, reminiscent of the 1990s. The 
collective prosecution of elected politicians and human 
rights defenders in the KCK cases and the dissolution 
of yet another pro-Kurdish party sought to curtail the 
Kurds’ participation in the democratic system. The 
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disregard of civilian life in counter-terrorism opera-
tions was also back in force, as evident in the indis-
criminate killing of 34 Kurdish civilians engaged in 
the cross-border trade of smuggled goods near Uludere 
(Roboski) on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan on 28 
December 2011. The court indictment showed that the 
bombardment was carried out by the Turkish military 
and approved by the Chief of Staff, presumably with 
the consent of the government, allegedly on the basis 
that the victims were mistaken as PKK militants. Not 
only has there been “no direct apology, from either 
the military or civilian authorities”,163 but the govern-
ment denied any political responsibility, suggesting 
that the victims called for their end by engaging in 
criminal activities.164 
Certainly, sole responsibility for the current situa-
tion in Turkey does not rest with Europe. As with 
previous governments, the AKP’s rhetorical commit-
ment to European norms stemmed from a pragmatic 
concern to facilitate Turkey’s admission to the EU. 
The gradual erosion of this prospect, the (false) self-
confidence of the government based on Turkey’s 
economic growth and potential regional leadership, 
Erdoğan’s personal ambitions to run the country 
under a presidential system and the lack of a strong 
democratic opposition as a viable alternative to the 
AKP had mutually reinforcing effects on the rise of 
authoritarian government policies. The Kurdish natio-
nal movement, for its part, often misread the Euro-
pean political landscape; misjudged the effectiveness 
of its lobbying, raising unrealistic expectations (such 
as European endorsement of democratic autonomy); 
and relied heavily on the sympathy and support it 
received from small political parties (such as the Euro-
pean United Left/Nordic Green Left at the European 
Parliament) who are ineffective vis-à-vis European insti-
tutions and governments. It has expected the same 
degree of support from the EU, although, from the 
perspective of European policymakers, the nature of 
the conflict and the attitude of the Turkish govern-
ment “fundamentally changed from the ‘90s to the 
2000s”.165 
163  European Commission, Turkey 2012 progress report, 34. 
164  In December 2013, a military prosecutor dismissed the 
case on the grounds that the killings were an unavoidable 
mistake, “prov[ing] once again that in Turkey the state can 
kill civilians and get away with it”. Emma Sinclair-Webb, 
“Dispatches: Impunity and Cover-up in Turkey”, Human Rights 
Watch, 7 January 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/07/ 
dispatches-impunity-and-cover-turkey. 
165  Lagendijk on 5 October 2013 (see note 98). 
What Role for European Institutions? 
Recent political developments in Turkey have shown, 
once again, that the initiation of a genuine political 
transition will only be possible with coherent, con-
tinuous and critical European oversight. The Gezi pro-
tests led EU policymakers to reflect on their responsi-
bilities for the domestic situation. The opinion that a 
vibrant accession process in which Chapters 23 and 24 
had long been opened would have enabled the EU to 
better exert its influence on the Turkish government 
found growing support in Brussels.166The Gezi protests 
also showed that there was “a growing and active civil 
society in Turkey”,167 which saw that the EU is still 
important and valuable for the protection of human 
rights.168 This observation is also valid for Kurdish civil 
society, which continues to hold high expectations of 
the EU and the ECtHR. The Kurdish rights groups be-
lieve that the stances that European institutions will 
take in key issues, such as the Roboski and KCK cases, 
are critical. The ECtHR’s long-overdue decision in the 
KCK case, pending in Strasbourg since March 2010,169 
is highly anticipated. 
After a decade of keeping a low profile in Turkey’s 
Kurdish conflict, it is high time for the European dele-
gations, particularly from Brussels, to resume official 
visits to the Kurdish region, systematically monitor 
high-profile cases and critically address the criminali-
sation of political activities as well as the impunity 
shielding security officers and the obstacles to the 
political representation of minorities, such as the elec-
toral threshold. The diversification of counterparts 
through re-engaging in continuous and structural 
dialogue with a wide range of civil society actors in 
the Kurdish region would enable European policy-
makers to make better-informed decisions and accu-
rate analyses, minimising the risk of being misled by 
government circles. 
The EU and its member states understandably kept 
a low profile with respect to the peace talks in Turkey, 
which they were not invited to take part in,170 and 
166  Personal communications with EU officials. 
167  European Commission, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, 11. 
168  EU official-3 (see note 99). 
169  The first petition was filed on 19 March 2010 on behalf 
of 53 defendants. On 5 June, a second petition was filed on 
behalf of 50 more defendants and the ECtHR was asked to 
join the two applications in one case. The Court has yet to 
issue an admissibility decision. 
170  Personal communication with EU official-2 on 12 Novem-
ber 2013. 
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refrained from interfering in a process that it con-
sidered “primarily an internal matter”.171 However, 
what started as an attempt to resolve the armed 
conflict has turned into the political platform where 
the Kurds’ democratic rights claims – long supported 
by the EU and the ECtHR – are being negotiated in 
exchange for the PKK’s surrender of its arms. In this 
sense, the peace talks are not entirely an internal 
matter, but a process that needs to be closely moni-
tored by the EU, as far as the negotiations over the 
Kurds’ demands for equal treatment, rule of law and 
democracy are concerned. 
Finally, with respect to the accession process, the 
debates over the opening of Chapter 22 showed that 
the EU still retains a degree of leverage over Turkey, 
which proves most effective when the progress of the 
talks is conditional to the adoption of concrete human 
rights reforms. However, such a strategy would only 
be successful if the EU shows a clear commitment to 
Turkey’s full membership and attaches no additional 
strings other than the same conditions imposed on all 
candidates. 
171  EU official-1 (see note 78). 
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